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Executive Summary  
 
This thesis provides is contextual study of private investing activity in Norway. It 
addresses both theoretical aspects as well as practical implications of the VC and PE influence 
on the economics of the investee firm. The aim of this analysis is to understand how the 
presence of VC and PE investments in a firm affects it’s performance and growth.  
In the theoretical part we discuss the structure and dynamics of the venture capital 
cycle, specify the value adding activities provided by investors and make an overview of 
Norwegian VC and PE market specifics.  
In the empirical analysis we focus on value creation activities. We address the key 
drivers of the investment activity and disclose the firm specific characteristics, that investors 
are looking for in the potential investee companies. Using CSI database, which contains 
observation on investee firms from 1992 to 2013, we analyze the value creation effects of the 
investments on Seed/Venture as well as Buyout stages using the following variables: sales 
revenues, payroll expenses, equity ratio, patents, R&D.  
The results suggest that in the majority of the cases, VC and PE investing has a positive 
impact on value creation in the investee firms both on Seed/Venture and Buyout stages. We 
confirmed the fact that company’s post investment performance, regardless the stage of 
investing is generally better than pre investment, meaning that the VC and PE investing is an 
efficient mechanism that enhances company’s growth and performance.   
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays Private Equity (PE) and Venture Capital (VC) investments are raising 
substantial amount of attention in various research disciplines within finance and economics. 
This field is often considered to be underresearched, because of difficulties in accessing the 
accurate data, due to numerous non-disclosure agreements and unwillingness to share the 
information from the investor’s side. However, despite all these obstacles it is critical to pay 
close attention to the evolution of this industry: look deeper into the stages of the investment 
cycle and study specific actors and strategies undertaken by providers of the capital within this 
area in order to understand the actual value creation process that is enhanced by these types of 
investments.  As H. Landström (2007) points out, the economic importance of venture capital 
makes it crucial to understand the way venture capital market operates and how venture 
capitalists manage their investments. 
VC is often called the “money of invention” (Black & Gilson, 1998) demonstrating how 
important it is for boosting innovative initiatives and entrepreneurship. It is considered as one 
of the key drivers for innovation led economic growth. Support for VC has therefore become 
a focus area for policy makers globally. Important consequences of high PE and particularity 
VC investment activity are better competitiveness of the entrepreneurial ventures that receive 
these types of funding and increase innovation in the economy. Nevertheless, it remains to be 
a controversial topic, raising a large debate in the literature. Researches and practitioners argue 
whether VC and PE investments have a clear positive impact on boosting innovation, or the 
investors primarily focus their attention on already highly innovative companies with 
substantial growth potential.  
Addressing the example of the American economy, we can observe a highly developed 
economy, being at the forefront of the innovative developments globally. It is successful in 
commercializing innovation and supporting growth-orientated entrepreneurial ventures. We 
all know that USA remains to be the “motherland” of VC and PE investing, as well as most of 
the literature is based upon the evidence from American data. However, the current study is 
still particularly relevant with regard to Norwegian context. Having a prosperous economy 
and good development prospects, mainly due to high oil exports, Norway used to operate 
under a well-functioning and efficient model of a welfare state. One of the key drivers for its’ 
success was high oil price, and once it drops Norwegian economy immediately starts feeling 
the dramatic consequences of such dependency, which we can observe in the year 2015. 
Nowadays, it is seems clear in the long run, the current strategy is not sustainable. The country 
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needs to search for alternative solutions in order to guarantee a stable economy in the future 
and overcome the resource curse. The fact of high economics dependency on natural resources 
in general is widely seen as a trap that blocks entrepreneurial initiatives and innovation in 
countries with rich mineral deposits. Therefore, it is a matter of critical importance to place 
emphasis on stimulating PE and VC investing in Norway. It will help nurturing entrepreneurial 
initiatives and result in establishing high potential innovative companies, which will ensure 
stability and prosperity of the Norwegian economy, create new jobs and generate income and 
wealth for the society in the years to come.  
The aim of this thesis is to study how economic value is created via VC and PE 
investing. We would like to approach this problem mainly from an entrepreneurial perspective, 
looking into how these investments serve financial and non-financial  needs of the new 
business, which often do not manage to raise necessary funds from more conventional sources.  
In order to narrow down the focus of this work, we prefer to leave returns on investments and 
other formal investor’s financial success indicators out of the research scope. In the same time, 
we plan to take a broader business view of the problem, that is why we will not be constraint 
by a financial perspective on the VC investing. Moreover, we will often omit the details related 
to purely financial aspects of this problem, as it is not our research priority.  
The theoretical part of the paper we will cover mainly VC investments as they are often 
considered a trigger for economic turnarounds and cause structural reorientation from resource 
dependency to innovative track. In the practical part due to limited amount of data available, 
and having the aim to improve the quality of the research findings, we will cover both VC and 
PE investments and will try to find out how presence of these investments impacts the 
performance of the firm. 
This work is divided into three main parts. First, we will provide an extensive overview 
of the VC industry in order to draw a clear picture of the investment process and discover 
various stages and roles of VC investors. Second, we will focus on reviewing the most 
prominent research on VC investing, placing particular focus on value creation activities. 
Finally, in the practical part we will proceed with analyzing the actual data on PE and VC 
investments in Norwegian companies, provided by Center for Service Innovation (CSI) at 
Norwegian School of Economics.    
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2.  What is PE and VC?  
The European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA) defines Private 
Equity (PE) as a provision of equity capital by financial investors – over the medium or long 
term – to non-quoted companies with high growth potential (EVCA, 2007). Venture capital 
(VC) lies within the domain of PE but exclusively covers investing on the earlier stages of the 
company’s life cycle. VC is defined as a subset of PE that refers to equity investments made 
to support the pre-launch, launch and early stage development phases of a business (OECD, 
2013). 
Generally, there are several key differences between PE and public equity that need to 
be mentioned. Firstly, PE involves active ownership, meaning that besides bringing funds to 
the company, investors contribute with their professional expertise, whereas normal public 
equity does not include such involvement. Secondly, in contrast to public equity, PE relates to 
investing in unquoted companies. However, there can be exceptions, but in such a case most 
companies are delisted once the investment is made. Lastly, the investment horizon in PE is 
normally longer, because the value adding process through ‘living with the company’ takes 
significant amount of time. PE is viewed as a type of ‘alternative investing’, which is often 
contrasted to traditional investments in publicly traded stocks.  
For the purposes of this work, we will primarily focus our attention on the earlier stages 
of PE investing, covering mainly VC investments, however in the practical part we will also 
address the later stage investments that are pure PE. VC investments are targeting young, 
innovative companies with high growth potential, which often heavily invest in R&D. Due to 
significant amount of intangible assets in their asset base, it can often be problematic to assess 
and objectively predict their future performance.   
On the illustration below, we present a classification of investments, based on the 
maturity of portfolio companies. The classifications might slightly vary, but the VC segment 
is mainly composed of four main stages: seed, start-up, expansion and replacement, whereas 
the later stage representing buyouts lies within PE.  
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Figure 2.1. PE investments classification, according to maturity of target companies, based 
on EVCA, 2014 
Providing a general classification we should mention that buyouts are often called 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), due to the fact, that they are mostly financed through leverage. 
Further, LBOs are subdivided into management buyouts (MBOs) and management buy-ins 
(MBIs). In MBOs existing managers are acquiring the control over the company from previous 
owners, whereas in MBIs external management takes the control over the target company.   
2.1 Key actors in the VC investment process  
In this section we will determine the main actors of the VC investment process in further detail 
in order to envisage a more clear picture of how this investment mechanism works. There are 
four main actors, which are closely interconnected: VC funds, individual investors, VC 
managers and portfolio companies.  
According to Metrick and Yasuda (2011) there are five main characteristics of a VC fund as a 
crucial actor in the VC investment eco-system: 
 It is a financial intermediary, meaning that it takes the investors’ capital and invests it 
directly into portfolio companies.   
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Slightly simplifying the model, the general organization structure of a VC fund can be 
defined as a limited partnership, which is directed and managed by a venture capitalist, also 
called general partner (GP). The money is raised from a wide pool of sources, including 
institutional investors and later on invested in a selected range of companies. Investors in order 
to keep the limited liability, are not involved in the daily operations of the fund and do not 
directly participate in the investment decisions. Therefore, they keep the status of limited 
partners (LPs) (Sahlman, 1990). 
 VC invests only in private companies, meaning that once the investments are made, 
the companies cannot be immediately traded on a public stock exchange.  
 Normally VC takes an active role in monitoring and helping the companies in its 
portfolio.  
It can be done in many ways, but often a VC takes a seat on the board of directors in 
order to have control over the decision making process and provide expert advice at the highest 
level of the company’s management. In addition to that, in order to assure growth and control, 
over company’s activities VCs generally require diligent reporting from the entrepreneurs’ 
side (Busenitz et al., 2004). The value-adding function of a VC will be studied in details later. 
 The primary goal of the VC is to maximize its financial return by exiting investments 
through a trade sale or an IPO.  
The most critical stage of the whole investment process is the exit, which is done by 
selling the stake in the portfolio company via IPO or a trade sale in order to get financial return 
and pay back the investors. The type of preferred exit is agreed upon before the investment is 
made and is disclosed in details in a standardized agreement. The choice of exit strategy also 
heavily relies upon the type of VC investor, as well as the stage of investment that is targeted.  
 A VC fund invests to finance internal growth of companies.  
This characteristic discloses the essence of a VC, that aims at growing the business, by 
adding the value throughout the investment process via bringing expertise and coaching 
alongside with the funding.  Classic VC firms are active at all stages. According to one of the 
typologies they include seed, start-up, expansion stages (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011) 
Considering financial interests, it is important to point out that the VC firm, or more 
correctly the management company of the VC fund, generally takes around 1 - 2.5 % of the 
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fund’s annual committed capital as a management fee. This is used for operating the fund and 
paying out salaries to partners and other employees. The VC firm also has a stake in the profits 
of the fund, called carried interest. It averages to 20% and this income is divided between all 
venture partners (De Clercq et al., 2006). VC firms create funds with approximately 10 years 
life span and hold several funds under management simultaneously. Often they specialize by 
sector or by the stage of the company’s development (Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993)  
As indicated earlier, individual investors play the role of LPs in the VC fund so that they 
have limited responsibility, meaning that they are confined to the initial amount of money 
invested. In this case, the principal-agent conflict might arise. Individual investors act as 
principals, relying on GPs of the VC fund to act in their best interests. In order to manage this 
conflict of interests, contractual specification of the compensation is an important way for 
limited partners to get their interests aligned with the VCs (Gompers & Lerner, 1999).  
The general structure of the VC investment process dynamics can be viewed on the 
illustration below, that depicts core elements in the VC investing framework: investors, VC 
fund, portfolio companies and management company.  
 
Figure 2.2. Overview of the VC investing process, from Manigart & Meuleman (2004) 
In fact, type of ownership is one of most critical characteristics for the organization of 
a VC fund.  For example, independent VC funds invest on behalf of institutional investors and 
wealthy individuals, whereas captive funds where most of the funds are provided by one 
shareholder of the management company, might have alternative ownership structures that 
affect their choice of funding and the whole investment process (Da Rin, et al., 2011). Main 
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providers of the capital for captive funds are governments, corporations, family offices and 
banks. Van Osnabrugge & Robinson (2001) point to some aspects that critically distinguish 
independent VCs from captive VCs. Independent funds often have a pressure to divest and 
have a clear focus on financial returns, whereas captive funds are flexible and can exploit 
upside potential for waiting when it arises.  
2.2 Other types of VC providers 
There is a rather wide spectrum of potential financing sources available for funding a 
new venture. An entrepreneur working on a newly founded company can choose, either to be 
limited by the amount of his own funds or refer to the help of informal investors, who are often 
called ‘3Fs’: family, friends and fools – which can provide the initial funding at the very 
beginning. On the other hand, potentially there is an opportunity for getting traditional bank 
financing, which is hardly accessible to many entrepreneurs, due to excessive level of risk 
associated with startups. The VC universe offers several financing options that lie in between 
the two extreme cases mentioned above.   
There are three major financing providers, that offer venture capital equity funding to 
entrepreneurial ventures: traditional venture capitalists (VCs), business angels (BAs) and 
corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). All these three types have their own specificities, 
mainly targeting different types of projects. Besides that, there are other less significant types 
of capital providers, such as bank owned, government owned funds, and both private/public 
and hybrid funds related to research universities that are focusing on highly risky R&D 
intensive projects. 
In the previous section, the key characteristics of VCs have already been mentioned. 
Now we would like to clarify the specifics of two other subtypes of venture investing – 
business angels and corporate venture capitalists.  
Business angels (BAs) are individuals that specifically provide financing to young, 
growing firms. Most often they are either former entrepreneurs or retired senior executives 
who decided to invest their money. Very often they choose a narrow focus, prioritizing the 
industry where they feel most knowledgeable and experienced due to their occupation 
(Harrison & Mason, 1996). They are highly committed to the success of the investee firm and 
are engaged in intensive mentoring and non-financial support of the firms in their portfolio. In 
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general, the relationship between the investee and BA is much less formal compared to the 
relationship with a VC. Overall, BAs focus on the earlier, most risky stages of investing such 
as seed and pre-seed.  
On average, the ownership stake that BA owns in the venture does not exceed 10 -15% 
of the general sum of capital invested (De Clercq et al., 2006). The reporting mechanisms are 
quite relaxed as well as the agreements between investors and investees are rather informal. 
From the standpoint of the entrepreneur, BAs are the most expensive financing option, but 
most willing to take the risk.  
On the other end of the VC investing spectrum, reside corporate venture capitalists 
(CVCs), who represent another source of equity financing for entrepreneurial ventures. CVC 
is a type of captive fund which primary focus is shifted towards long-term strategic interests 
and further acquisition and full integration of the portfolio company into the operations of the 
firm. However, there are examples of technology lead companies that support new ventures in 
developing the technology targeted for their interests, but do not intend to internalize the 
venture into their own operations. According to Siegel (1988), the CVC acts as a financial 
intermediary of a non-financial company. Besides focusing on financial gains of investing, 
CVCs view strategic fit of their investments to the core business of the parent company as a 
primary goal. This way CVCs aim to assure the indirect value for the parent company, in case 
of success of the venture, the parent company can acquire the total stake in the company. 
However, besides acquisition, common exit routes of CVCs also include trade sale, which is 
less preferred. In the detailed table below, we summarized the key characteristics for three 
main types of VC providers: VCs, Bas and CVCs. 
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Table 2.1. Characteristics of VC providers, based on De Clercq & Sapienza (2007) 
 Professional Venture 
Capitalists (VCs)  
Business Angels 
(BAs) 
Corporate Venture 
Capitalists (CVCs)  
Source of funds  Investing from 
outside limited 
partners  
 Investing own 
money  
 Investing 
corporate funds  
Legal form  General partnership   Private 
individual  
 Subsidiary of a 
large firm  
Typical size of 
investments & 
financing 
stages  
 $2-10 M 
 All stages 
 $ 50-100 M 
 Seed & 
startup 
 $ 2-20 M 
 Later preffered 
Motive for 
investment 
 Equity growth only   Equity growth 
and personal  
 Strategic and 
equity growth 
Investment 
criteria 
 Growth prospects  
 Great management  
 Growth and 
mentoring 
prospects  
 Strategic value 
and fit  
Finding 
investors 
 Relatively easy to 
find  
 Hard to find   Few, but easy to 
find  
Reaching 
agreement  
 Lengthy and 
extensive due 
diligence  
 Quick to reach 
an agreement 
if ‘fit’ is found  
 Hard to meet 
the ‘fit’ 
requirements  
Reporting 
requirements  
 Regular reporting 
requirements, 
financially focused  
 Light, but 
vary by 
individual  
 Regular 
reporting 
requirements, 
strategically 
focused 
Level of 
involvement  
 Moderate, generally 
through board 
membership  
 Low to 
extremely 
high, informal  
 Low or 
moderate, 
board 
membership  
Exit planning 
and method  
 Often planned: IPO 
or trade sale  
 Often 
unplanned: 
trade sale  
 Often 
unplanned: IPO 
trade sale 
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3. Venture capital investment cycle  
Following the classification, presented in the major research, we distinguish three 
different stages in the VC investment cycle: pre-investment, post-investment, and exit phases 
(Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984). In this section we will address the specifics and analyze the actions 
that are typically undertaken at each stage. 
3.1 Pre-investment stage  
There are several key characteristics of the pre-investment stage, which need to be 
taken into account. At this point VC is looking for potential investments, and therefore it 
should consider the most promising ventures that can potentially generate high capital gains. 
Besides that, it is crucial that the idea possesses uniqueness as well as has high growth 
potential. As far as VCs are always results orientated, it is necessary to keep the balance 
between the implementation time and amount of capital invested. Another element that is 
critical for this stage is the focus on management team or the individual entrepreneur, who is 
supposed to share the goals and aspirations of investors (De Clercq et al., 2006) 
There are three phases, that are typically present at the pre-investment stage: deal 
origination, deal screening, deal evaluation and deal structuring. According to the evidence 
from the literature, less than 2 percent of all deals entering the deal origination stage finally 
end up receiving VC financing (Fried & Hisrich, 1994).  
3.1.1 Deal origination  
At this stage the key aim for a both VC and an entrepreneur is to get to know each 
other and to establish a good contact.  The reputation, width of the VC network and referral 
system originated from contacts with lawyers, bankers, consultants and accountants makes it 
easier for a VC to find attractive and secure deals. (Shane & Cable, 2002) At the same time, 
syndication of investments among several investors of a similar kind or even different investor 
types, for example BAs and traditional VCs also plays an  important role, because it facilitates 
the cooperation between multiple investors and makes the completion of the whole procedure 
easier. (Brander et al., 2002).  
 17 
3.1.2 Deal screening  
Deal screening is a very important stage in the VC investing process. At this stage the 
critical task for a VC is to determine whether the potential investee meets expectations of the 
investor with regard to industry, sector, investment stage, geographic location and amount of 
capital needed (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). Kaplan & Strömberg (2000) also point out more 
general criteria, helping help investors to filter out projects, such as: entrepreneur’s background, 
the technology of the project and the management risk. The screening process is very time 
consuming from the side of the VC, therefore, the initial filtering is conducted via diligent 
scheming through the business plans. In case the initial screening is successful, the VC looks 
deeper into the potential of the project, checking for internal fit and as a next step, entrepreneur 
is invited for a meeting with a VC. Not surprisingly, the rate of projects surviving screening 
is very low (1.4% - 3.4%), as investors set very strict criteria in order to let only the most 
promising projects to follow the process (Hudson & Evans, 2005). High filtering barrier is 
intended to minimize the costs of screening and deal evaluation with regard to time impact 
from the investor’s side. According to the research, reaching a decision takes approximately 6 
minutes in the screening phase, compared to 21 minutes in the evaluation phase (Hall & Hofer, 
1993), therefore screening can significantly reduce the costs of the overall pre-investment 
procedure. If this procedure is completed successfully, the successful projects passes through 
to the next stage – deal evaluation.  
3.1.3 Deal evaluation  
The deal evaluation / due diligence phase includes intensive interaction between 
prospective investor and the management team of the potential investee firm in the form of 
interviews, background checks etc. This is done in order to get better insights about how the 
firm can successfully meet the goals being set and keep the promises made to the VC and 
make sure that it can assure the substantial growth prospects that were envisaged initially. 
Later upon the completion of this procedure, the process is finalized with structuring of the 
final deal.  
3.1.4 Deal structuring  
In deal structuring, valuation of the venture is an essential phase. The main goal is to 
assure efficient pricing of the securities, which the VC is purchasing. The frame of reference 
for this process is determined by the final ‘selling’ price of the company upon exit. As far as 
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often it is problematic to accurately determine the actual expected cash flows of the new 
venture, the valuation done by the VC becomes more intuitive and heavily depends upon 
subjective expectations of investors. At this time, the critical aspect is achieving required rate 
of return by the time of the exit (De Clercq et al., 2006). Due to significant risks involved in 
early stage investing, VCs often obtain high stakes in the ventures they are investing in, 
intending to keep as full control over situation as possible. 
Apart from the valuation, there are several other aspects that need to be taken into 
account: the extent of control that the VC can exercise, the composition of the board of 
directors, mechanisms given to VCs to force future exit events, conditions of top management 
employee contracts etc. (Bouillet-Cordonnier, 1992). When the VC steps in, the original 
entrepreneur often remains to hold a substantial amount of shares and control. The 
entrepreneur is often one of the key drivers of the company’s success, possessing the strategic 
vision of development and valuable expertise. However, due to potentially high downside risks 
and big uncertainty, VCs try to design contracts in such a way that they can potentially 
minimize the exposure to such risks (De Clercq et al., 2006). Staging of the investments is one 
of most efficient techniques applied by the VCs aimed at lowering the exposure to downside 
risks, especially at the earliest stages of investing when the risk remains highest (Sahlman, 
1990). For that purpose, investments are often undertaken in portions/stages, which are 
designed in order to mark milestones that the entrepreneur needs to reach in order to get 
subsequent tranche of financing. In this regard, entrepreneur’s self-assessment is essential in 
order to assure that the VCs expectations, reflected in milestones that are set realistically.  
3.2 Post-investment stage  
At this stage of the investment cycle, we refer to all post-financing activities that 
involve VCs. There is often a mismatch between the business and technical expertise of 
entrepreneurs. Innovators, having high technical expertise, are likely to lack business acumen, 
whereas business people are often missing technical knowledge. Therefore, entrepreneurs 
need to be carefully advised, guided and controlled in order to be able to meet the agreed 
targets successfully. One of initial tools for mitigating potential risks from the investor’s side 
is efficient contracting, which is ensured at the pre-investment stage. However, later in the 
process there is always a need for more careful supervision, which is consuming more time 
and effort and includes value-adding and active involvement.  
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According to De Clercq, Fried, Lentonen and Sapienza (2006) at the post-investment stage, 
there are several roles that VC tend to combine while providing monitoring and value-adding 
activities, which include strategic, financing, networking, interpersonal, reputational and 
discipline roles (De Clercq, 2006). The monitoring activities mitigate agency risks in 
VC/entrepreneur relationships and ensure sufficient amount of control (Sapienza & Gupta, 
1994). It is also important to mention that generally VCs play a much more active role in 
monitoring of the investments than, for example banks, due to high illiquidity and uncertainty, 
and therefore, a higher risk exposure (Salhman, 1990). Nevertheless, the impact of monitoring 
should not be overestimated, because in any case it is mostly limited to consulting function, 
as the VC can not take on any operating responsibilities, which supposed to be conducted by 
the management of the company (Gifford, 1997). From the perspective of an entrepreneur, the 
value added compensates for the high costs of VC financing, whereas from the position of the 
VC it increases the average return on investment (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). What comes to a 
more detailed assessment of the value adding activities, we will focus on them later on in this 
work.  
Strategic role 
This is mainly a supportive role, meaning that VC regularly participates in the decision 
making process and communicates with the venture’s management, helping to professionalize 
the business (Hellman & Puri, 2002). Ideally, this interaction is organized in a form of 
guidance and advice being provided, rather than making final decisions instead of the 
management team.  
Financing role 
Provision of financial assistance is another strong side that VC can offer. Arranging 
syndicated investing and securing financing from such sources as other VCs, banks etc. is 
critical for a growing business (Lerner, 1994). Another important element that VCs can help 
to set in place is the development of strong financial management procedures, which can 
assure financial health of the venture (Pratch, 2005). 
Networking role  
VCs always have a wide range of general business contacts, and if they have focus in 
a particular field, they also possess industry contacts, which can be of great use for the new 
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venture. It also can be considered as one of the aspects of value adding that the VC ensures 
for the new venture. These useful contacts can help to boost marketing and increase sales, by 
attracting new customers via existing partners, find potential acquirers for a trade sale, as well 
as look for new service providers (Pratch, 2005). 
Interpersonal role  
Starting up and running a new business is a very challenging and stressful task that not 
everybody is capable of handling efficiently. In times of distress or doubt, an entrepreneur 
might not be willing to share the problems and concerns with his direct team members or 
subordinates and therefore he resigns to moral support, coaching and guidance that the more 
experienced colleagues from the VC side can provide (Pratch, 2005).  
Reputational role  
The reputational element is critical for a new venture due to high uncertainty and wide 
risk exposure. In case a reputable VC is involved, many risks can be mitigated and it becomes 
much easier to persuade wide range of stakeholders to get involved into the new initiative. It 
also facilitates easier recruitment of new experienced managers, getting new customers, 
attracting other investors etc. (Pratch, 2005). Sometimes VC’s reputation is also critical for 
recruiting the senior management team through existing professional network, once the 
existing team does not meet the expectations (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2000).  
Discipline role  
This role is often referred to as controlling role, meaning that VC influence internal 
organization of the firm (Hellman & Puri, 2002). This involvement of the VC includes certain 
amount of pressure towards the entrepreneur. It incorporates continuous evaluation, and if 
necessary, the replacement of the management team. Entrepreneur is bind to respect the 
deadlines and objectives being set. These measures add value to the venture as a whole, but 
are not necessarily favorable for individual entrepreneur. These disciplinary acts create a 
healthier atmosphere and keeps entrepreneurs focused, which is crucial for the success of the 
venture (Sapienza, 1989). 
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3.3 Exit phase  
As it was mentioned earlier, successful exit for the majority of VC investors is the key 
indication of a good investment strategy, and overall success of the investment made. A clear 
strategy ensures liquidity of initially illiquid stock of privately held company that can be 
converted into cash or publicly traded stock. There are four common strategies for a VC exit 
(De Clercq & Sapienza, 2006):  
 the venture is going public via (IPO), selling the stock at the public stock market;  
 the venture as a whole can be sold via trade sale;  
 the venture can buyback its’ stock from the VC investors;  
 the venture can be liquidated and the residual of the proceeds is going to the VC once 
all creditors are paid off.  
Regarding the VCs’ preferences, the most desirable outcome is an IPO, as companies tend 
to get higher valuations in public markets compared to trade sales, therefore VCs can extract 
higher proceeds from such an exit. However, even though in many cases IPO is preferential, 
it does not provide immediate and full liquidity, whereas trade sale does and statistically turns 
out to be the most common exit route (Relander et al., 1994). In the same time, trade sale – the 
sale of the major stake in the company to strategic or financial investors, remains to be risky from 
the entrepreneur’s perspective, as it often causes the loss of control over the company. In the 
trade sale most often the portfolio company is sold to an industrial actor, but also the VC can 
sell it to a PE fund for further development of the venture. 
The third, most common exit strategy is buying back the VC’s stock by the venture, 
meaning that VC leaves the company, but the entrepreneur/management remains and increases 
the significance and control via buying the stock back from the VC. In this case, most often 
the financing comes from debt, meaning that significant amount of future cash flow is used 
for paying it back. 
And, finally, the least preferable scenario is liquidation. In this case, the assets of the 
company are liquidated at the salvage value, and the proceeds go to security holders following 
the order of seniority. This situation represents the worst outcome for both sides – entrepreneur 
and the VC, because the VC often loses part, if not all of the initial investment and as well the 
entrepreneur loses the money and the whole established business (Cumming & Macintosh, 
2003). In addition to the above mentioned exit strategies, there are such options for divesting 
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as: repayment of principal loans, write-offs and sales to management MBOs and MBIs, 
however these opportunities are less frequent. (EVCA, 2012) 
Value-adding activities such as assistance and support, mentioned under the discussion 
of the post-investment stage come at a cost. Overall, VC financing turns out to be very 
expensive for the company, compared to other financing sources. Investors expect a very 
decent rate of return in exchange for the additional services they provide, generally it varies 
from 36% to 45% in the case of early stage investing (Sapienza et al., 2002).  
3.4 VC investment strategies  
The efficiency of managing VC investment portfolio has clear impact on VC returns, 
therefore it is necessary to discuss the most common investment strategies. There are three 
main VC investment strategies that will be discussed: portfolio size scope, cross-border 
investing and syndication. The first two strategies will be covered in this section, whereas the 
latter will be addressed later in this work.  
3.4.1 Portfolio size and scope 
The research of Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) provides evidence that human capital of 
VC partners, meaning time and effort invested in the company, is a scare and valuable resource 
and therefore it has to be allocated wisely. In larger portfolios when a probability of a startup 
failure is rather high, human capital can be better applied across a wider range of companies. 
On the contrary, in smaller portfolio partners are more eager to provide higher quality support 
to companies. This research demonstrates that VC management firms, or more generally, 
investors tend to choose larger portfolios when startups are riskier and have lower value.  
The work of Inderst et al. (2007) demonstrates a different approach. There are 
arguments for keeping portfolio size constant and boosting competition among startups for 
VC financing, that initiates higher effort from the entrepreneur. This approach has a limited 
application, as it has value only in case of staged financing.  
Hochberg and Westerfield (2010) claim that as investors have limited time and 
abilities, there is a trade-off between portfolio size and scope. Narrower focus limits the 
diversification across industry, but increases payoffs from a particular industry. Wider 
portfolio focus increases return on investment, as investors make their choice from a wider 
pool of investments. The model of Hochberg and Westerfield (2010) claims that optimal 
 23 
portfolios are larger and less focused if there are enough skilled partners to cover wider scope 
of investing.  
3.4.2 Cross-border investing  
Investing abroad has the risks due to distance, distinct legal and institutional 
framework, but in the same time it widens investment scope and can bring high returns in the 
aftermath.  
Aizenman and Kendall (2008) show that such factors as geographic distance, common 
language and colonial ties are reliable indicators of high investment flows between countries. 
The US remains to be the biggest market for VC investing. Cross-border deals are typical for 
other markets, while it is rarely the case for the US. Aizenman and Kendall (2008) find that 
countries, which attract VC investments from abroad, tend to have high level of human 
capital, better business environments, and well-developed financial markets. 
Hazarika et al. (2009) has an interesting observation about the cross-border investing 
with regard to cultural distance. Institutional differences imply higher risks and motivate VCs 
to conduct more diligent screening of the projects, therefore only very promising firms succeed 
in getting funded.  
The study of Chemmanur et al. (2010) demonstrated that large distance between the 
VC and the investee firm has bad impact on company’s performance, whereas the presence of 
local syndication partner was proved to have positive correlation with success.  
Even though there are many theoretical implications drawn from the recent literature, 
VCs tend to keep their actual investment strategies secret, that is why little practical evidence 
is available to support these findings.  
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4. Value adding activities 
In the following section we will discover in more details the VC value adding process, 
and provide a deeper review of the relevant literature. Our current aim is to find out how 
investors enhance the value in the investee firms.  
Value adding investors provide more types of support to entrepreneurs than just 
financial resources. They strive to help the startup to achieve the maximum value and growth. 
Gompers and Lerner (1999), claim that VCs possess specialized industry knowledge, as well 
as wide network of contacts that they share with their affiliate companies.  
Many well-known high tech companies, for example Google, Inter, Microsoft referred 
to the help of VC investors at the very start. Statistically, it is observed that the majority of 
investments go to such industries as computer electronics, telecom, nanotechnology, life 
science and bioscience (Cumming, 2010).  In the same time, there are examples of 
conventional businesses such as Starbucks and Staples that also received VC funding. These 
great names are the ones who are incredibly successful and have grown enormously over the 
years, however, there are many others, that received VC support, but failed.  
In the early works of Sahlman (1990) and Gorman and Sahlman (1989) there is 
evidence that VCs tend to spend much time with their investee firms. Gorman and Sahlman 
(1989) illustrate three main activities that VC investors provide in addition to financing: 1) 
building the investors group; 2) reviewing and helping to formulate the business strategy; 3) 
filling in the management team. Mason and Harrison (1999) write ‘venture capital firms 
typically also adopt a ‘‘hands on’’ investment style in order to limit risk and add value to their 
investments, requiring close contact to be maintained with investee companies’. Venture 
investing involves high uncertainty, because the startup environment is volatile, new 
information arrives often and important decisions have to be taken quickly. Therefore, both 
parties - investors and investees should realize all the compromises and risks while agreeing 
upon a deal. It is critical to take into account that active value-adding services from the 
investor’s side do not guarantee the success for a startup. 
There are three main ways how investors can add value to the business. Firstly, the 
VCs provide advice of different kind, support the team with management expertise and 
industry contacts. Secondly, VCs can also add value by designing appropriate financing 
mechanisms (contracts for each particular investment case), by staging and syndication of 
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investments. And, finally, the third criteria of measuring added value is studying company 
performance upon VC exit, which is important, but lies outside the scope of the current work.  
4.1 Screening and monitoring  
Looking into the first way of adding value via coaching, support and guidance, there 
are two distinguished elements of this process highlighted in the literature: screening and 
monitoring. The true value adding can occur only on the post-investment stage, but the pre-
investment stage, when screening of investments is conducted is critical for all subsequent 
stages.  
During the screening procedure (so-called due – diligence), investors find the most 
promising startups, that have highest growth prospects. The study of Fenn, Liang, and Prowse 
(1995) illustrate the crucial importance of the screening process. Based on the American 
statistics they show that only 1% of all project applications received by VCs got funding 
The next question is how VCs measure the prospects of a new venture and make their 
final decision. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) demonstrate that VCs try to make a careful 
assessment of all potential risks involved. These risks are grouped in three categories: internal, 
external and execution risks. Internal risks include risks related to management processes and 
operations of the firm. External risks include exogenous factors, such as competition. The third 
type of risks involve problems related to complexity of project implementation. This study 
will be also relevant later on, when we address the issue of contracting. Because of the in depth 
assessment, VCs often manage to get a deep understanding of the startup’s business, and bring 
large follow-up value to the firm, compared to banks, which only provide funding. According 
to Ueda (2004) even if startups have access to other sources of financing, they often prefer the 
help of VCs.  
On the next stage, during the monitoring process investors put in their best effort and 
competence, in order to maximize the value of the startup and control its’ operations. There is 
a slight difference between advising and monitoring. Advising involves purely supportive 
activities, whereas monitoring incorporate stricter control, and even intervention, arising in 
bad times. Hellmann and Puri (2002) show that VCs tend to alternate these two roles based on 
the situation in the firm. Findings of Hellman and Puri (2000,2002) justify that VCs also 
increase the speed and efficiency of bringing new products to the market. They found evidence 
of providing incentive-based contracts to the employees, as well as confirmed that VCs aim at 
professionalizing the management of investee firms.  
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The observations of Puri and Zarutskie (2008) based on Longitudinal Research 
Database (LRD) from the U.S. Census Bureau data, showed that the flow of VC money is 
bigger in the sectors with higher IPO activity. This study confirms the hypothesis about the 
critical importance of successful exit procedure for classical VCs. The research of 
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2008) being based on the same data source, benchmarks 
VC-based versus non-VC based firms analyzing productivity and operational efficiency. They 
also studied the same parameters in the VC-backed firms, looking into the value before and 
after gaining financing, therefore trying to extract the impact of screening and monitoring on 
the operating efficiency. In this study Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2008) found the 
evidence, that based on total sales venture-backed firms are larger than non-venture backed, 
they also pay higher salaries and have higher skill levels, which are measured as a ratio of 
white collar workers to blue collar workers. This finding support the fact that generally VC 
goes to skilled entrepreneurs working in human capital intensive industries (Cumming, 2010). 
In the same study there is an important observation that venture-backed firms have higher 
Herfindahl index meaning that they operate in more concentrated industries.  
The research of Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2008) confirmed the fact that both 
screening and monitoring effects are present. They demonstrated that VC-backed firms have 
higher than average productivity even before the investment is made – which supports the 
argument about the importance of screening. Also, productivity continues to increase 
gradually after the investment is made, meaning that VC succeeds in the monitoring activity. 
It was observed that in the post-investment period both sales and costs show substantial 
growth, and the productivity improvement is reached by higher growth in sales compared to 
growth in costs.  
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2008) found that general pattern is that VCs look 
for better firms and afterwards do the best to develop that potential. Also, they came to the 
conclusion that the highest increases in productivity happen during first two rounds of 
financing and later on the productivity remains stable.  
In fact there is another characteristic of the VC that is important for the investment 
process – the reputation of a VC firm.  High-reputation VCs can better perform monitoring 
activities than lower-reputation VCs. In this case reputation plays the role of a quality indicator 
that attracts the attention of startups. This finding of Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2008) 
is also consistent with the work of Hsu (2004). The study suggests that startups are on average 
three times more likely to accept an offer from a high-reputation VC than a low-reputation 
VC. In the same time, high-reputation VC has more power in negotiating the deal terms with 
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startups. Also high reputation VC-backed firms show larger sales volumes compared to low-
reputation VC backed firms.  
4.2 Contracting  
Contracting procedure is very important in structuring the VC deal and controlling for 
allocation of cash flow, liquidation and control rights between VCs and portfolio companies. 
The primary goal is to avoid potential conflicts of interests that may occur and minimize 
principal-agent risk. Good design of a contract is important in VC financing because of 
potentially large information asymmetries, moral hazard problems and opportunistic behavior 
that may arise between the two parties. Both entrepreneur and investor have their own goals 
to be met, but contracting helps to align their interests and structure their relationship in the 
best possible way.  
Interestingly, agency problems might appear in both directions: 1) entrepreneur may 
act opportunistically with regard to VC, 2) VC may act in harmful way toward the 
entrepreneur. In the VC contract design it is likely that VC have stronger bargaining power, 
however it is arguable that such contracts are biased toward VCs (Cumming, 2010). 
Reputation is one the crucial elements that prevents VCs from strongly opportunistic behavior 
toward entrepreneurs, because it is a very valuable asset in this business. If reputation is lost 
or strongly damaged, VC will have problems co-investing with other VCs (syndicating 
investments with other VCs).  
Technically, the key points in contracts between the VC and entrepreneur are cash flow 
and control rights.  Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) came to the conclusion that cash flow, control 
and liquidation rights in VC contracting can be distributed independently, while in the standard 
financial contracts these rights are often bundled. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) show that 
convertible preferred stocks are most widely used in VC transactions. Other mechanisms 
commonly used in this process are non-vesting stock options (with no voting rights), unvested 
stocks, explicit contracting on voting rights, securities with different voting and director 
election rights (Cumming, 2010). 
Typically, VC contracts make cash flow and control right contingencies based on 
certain targets. This strategy is fully consistent with “informativeness” principal of Holmström 
(1979), where the principal should link payments to contractible signals, verifying that those 
signals are correlated with the agent’s initial effort level.  
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The allocation of control and voting rights is also dependent on the track record of the 
entrepreneur and the uncertainly about the future firm’s prospects. Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2003) used their data to study uncertainty and potential conflict of interest. They came to the 
conclusions, which are in line with the work of Aghion and Bolton (1992).  This study 
suggests, that in a VC deal an investor has the right for exclusively financial benefits, while 
an entrepreneur, besides all financial perks might also have private benefits from the project. 
That is likely to happen because he is running the firm and has decision making rights. In such 
a case, Aghion and Bolton (1992) see that the entrepreneur has made a decision on whether to 
give up the control rights to the investor or keep the control rights and give the investor a 
minimum required return.  
When the stakes are high, the conflict of interest might arise, and entrepreneurs are 
likely to react in a suboptimal way. In such cases conflicts might occur, therefore it is better 
to allocate control rights to the investor. In the opposite case, when there is low likelihood of 
conflict of interest, therefore low uncertainty, it is better for an entrepreneur to keep those 
rights, as he is less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior.  
In the works of Hellman (1998) and Hart (2001) there is also evidence, supporting the 
former finding. Hellman (1998) argues that it is optimal to allocate more control rights to the 
investor when the entrepreneur lacks experience and productivity, in order to make it possible 
to hire an experienced manager if any major problems arise. Hart (2001) argues that in the 
firms with low risk of conflict, the investor should receive a fixed compensation, while the 
entrepreneur will benefit from the residual cash flow and control rights.  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) suggest that if the firm performance deteriorates, VC 
tend to claim more control and cash flow rights, as it became obvious that the entrepreneur 
does not succeed in managing the startup efficiently. Finding of Aghion and Bolton (1992) is 
consistent with this argument as it is more difficult to justify the VC control limitation over 
the startup firm.  
In the latter study, Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) looked into how internal risks (moral 
hazard, information asymmetry, and the likelihood of future conflicts) and external risks 
(shifts in macroeconomic environment, changes in regulations) impact contracting terms. It 
was observed that internal risks tend to shift the demand for control rights toward the VC, 
while external risks which are equally relevant for the entrepreneur and the investor, still 
guarantee less compensation for the entrepreneur and grant the VC more control, liquidation 
right etc. Similar pattern apply to the risks, which equally involve the VC and the entrepreneur, 
however the entrepreneur might have more control over the situation as he possesses execution 
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rights. This case is also associated with higher control rights of the VC. Even though such 
findings might seem controversial, in the earlier study of Hart and Moore (1994) there is a 
relevant explanation for such paradox. They claimed that since the involvement of the 
entrepreneur is crucial in mitigating such risks, it is critical to reduce the degree of the 
entrepreneur’s opportunistic behavior.  
Signaling theory is closely related to the contracting phase. At this stage startups often 
face problems when they are required to show signs of collaboration and commitments from 
reputable industry players in order to get credibility and necessary resources for developing 
the project. Positive signals from the investors demonstrate that startup has good prospects 
and cause reduction of information asymmetry, anticipating positive reaction of the market.  
Overall, Chemmanur and Chen (2008) created a very realistic theoretical framework 
that provides good justification for the previous findings on contracting. In this model the 
entrepreneur initially possesses more information about the startup than the VC, but after a 
while when the VC starts interacting with the firm, this information advantage gradually 
diminishes. Therefore, an equilibrium contract is designed in order to ensure the optimal effort 
level for both parties and maximize value addition. 
4.3 Stage financing  
The intuition behind the principal of stage VC financing is the following: order to 
conduct a regular monitoring and efficient control VCs are motivated to execute the 
investments in multiple rounds or stages. The study of Sahlman (1990) claims that staging is 
an important instrument for controlling VC risk. Therefore, staging is another defence 
technique against uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour of the entrepreneur. The VC can 
stop the investment process on the way if the entrepreneur does not meet the predefined 
milestones or shows weak commitment.  
The study of Gompers (1995) empirically demonstrates the mechanism of stage 
investing. He stipulates the necessity of staging by opportunistic behavior from the 
entrepreneur’s side. This could potentially involve hold-up problems and create agency costs. 
Before each investment stage, the VC agent gathers additional information about the 
performance of the firm and monitors the activity of the entrepreneur. When the investment is 
conducted on the very early stages of the company life cycle, total amount invested per stage 
is generally smaller. On the contrary, during later stages, when more tangible assets are already 
present in the company, investors are eager to invest more money per stage and require fewer 
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stages in total. That is the case, because if the startup fails, investors can recover larger portion 
of the initial investment upon liquidation of the assets.  
The study of Tian (2011) has an interesting finding that staging decisions depend on 
the proximity between the VC and the company. VCs are more likely to use staging practices 
if the company is geographically remote from the VC. He also finds evidence, with regard to 
exit performance. The best exit performance is achieved by companies, which are most 
distantly located and received investments in several subsequent stages. A related research of 
Bienz and Hirsch (2011) weights the benefits of milestone financing, where investor makes a 
decision to invest at a pre-determined price, against round-based financing, where typically 
the price per share is set at a time of refinancing. They provide evidence that milestone 
financing, is beneficial for entrepreneurs with weak bargaining power.  
Apparently, the presence of high R&D expenses also has impact on staging procedure. 
Gompers (1995) found the correlation between the funding duration and the R&D expenses 
incurred by the firm. High R&D increases asset specificity, which might stimulate the 
entrepreneur to engage in personal benefit-maximizing behavior. In this case VC funding 
duration should be diminished in order to avoid undesirable actions of the entrepreneur. In the 
same study Gompers (1995) demonstrates that high growth options result in more frequent 
financing. Industries that are highly volatile, but show big growth options, stimulate 
entrepreneurs to engage in personal benefit maximizing behavior.  
The finding of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) is in line with the previous observations 
about contracting, showing that successful track record help to reduce information asymmetry. 
Following the same intuition, investors tend to invest in such projects requiring less financing 
rounds. However, even if staging is a commonly used tool, that makes the position of the 
investor safer, there are certain critics of this technique. For example, Cornelli and Yosha 
(1997) provide evidence that in certain cases it may lead to window-dressing activities from 
the entrepreneur’s side. Neher (1999) highlights another controversy that lies in the risk of 
entrepreneur’s hold-up behavior. Nevertheless, despite the few theoretical findings underlying 
disadvantages of staging, it continue to be widely used in the VC investment practice.  
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4.4 VC syndication  
For VC investing process, syndication means pooling resources of several funds or 
investors together for making investment in a particular company. In the prominent research 
conducted by Lerner (1994), there are several main reasons explaining wide use of syndicated 
investing.   
First, syndication helps to verify the company’s prospects – simply, the initial due 
diligence is conducted by several VCs simultaneously and becomes more reliable. In this 
process the experience and competence matters a lot. According to Lerner (1994) more 
experienced VCs tend to syndicate with other experienced VCs, keeping the high standard of 
assessment and producing more accurate results.  
Casamatta and Haritchabalet (2007) constructed a theoretical model that is consistent 
with the finding of Lerner (1994). While discussing investment opportunities, investors are 
disclosing valuable information about the company, which may result in subsequent 
competition between the VCs for this investment opportunity. Therefore, in order to keep the 
opportunity to both consult and cooperate, VCs tend to form syndications.  
Second, Lerner (1994) says that experienced VCs tend to sell overpriced securities to 
less experienced VCs. In the later rounds, investments are done in such a way that the fraction 
of ownership of the initial VC stays constant.  
Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) suggest an alternative approach toward 
syndication. They argue that major reason for syndication is the necessity for complementing 
management skills and competence. As far as it is rather common for VCs to specialize, 
polling resources of several Venture capitalists may significantly improve the overall effect of 
monitoring. In this study Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) show that firms where 
syndicated investments are present, finally demonstrate higher financial returns due to 
improved monitoring.  
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5. Overview of Norwegian VC and PE market  
In this section of the theoretical part, we aim to briefly depict the positioning of the 
Norwegian VC and PE market on both Nordic and European scene. We also attempt to 
highlight the most significant dynamics, recently happening in the PE and VC industry in 
general in order to provide an up to date picture. However, primarily we will focus our 
attention the evolving trends in the VC segment in Norway in comparison to other segments 
and geographies.  
Besides the fact that Norwegian economy is highly developed, the VC investment 
scene is considered as young and immature compared to the European leaders in this industry. 
Even within the Nordic region we can clearly see that Norway lags behind such VC pioneering 
country as Sweden, where the investment scene is better established.   
Overall, the Norwegian state puts significant effort in developing investment initiatives 
and providing funding for the VC and PE market via such companies as Investinor and 
Argentum. However, the amount of institutional capital raised is lower in Norway than the 
average over European market (Thompson Reuters, 2013). This observation signals that the 
Norwegian VC market is very dependent on private and corporate capital providers, which are 
more subjected to diminish and cut Venture financing in periods of crisis, while institutional 
capital providers, such as pension funds and governments are generally less discouraged by 
short term economic slowdowns providing more stability for the investment environment.  
On the graph below we can observe the evolution of the VC market in the Nordics over 
the seven-year period: 2007-2013.  
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*Data for 2013 is preliminary  
Figure 5.1. VC activity in the Nordic region 2007-2013. Source: EVCA, 2014. Nordic Private 
Equity in the context of Europe, p.6 
This graph indicates that the activity in the region has slowed down over the last years, 
especially after the financial crisis of 2008. The other potential reason is the fact that the 
market is slightly becoming more mature. In the same time we can also observe that Norway’s 
contribution was following the general tendencies in the market.  
However, the statistics from Norwegian Venture Capital Association (NCVA) 
demonstrates interesting results from year 2014, meaning that the situation has significantly 
changed from 2013. Venture investments in Norwegian companies almost doubled over this 
period. The research of NVCA also shows that foreign PE and VC firms show a growing trend 
for investing in Norwegian portfolio companies, which can be considered as one of the good 
signs for growing global competitiveness of Norwegian companies and openness of the 
business environment for foreign capital.  
On the graph below we refer to the data from NVCA, summarizing the statistics on 
total amount invested by phase and number of investments per phase made only by Norwegian 
PE and VC firms in 2007-2014. NVCA uses a definition of a Norwegian PE or VC firm as a 
firm that is headquartered in Norway. In comparison to the amounts invested in Buyout 
segment, the amounts in Venture and Seed are much smaller.  Analyzing the dynamics of total 
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quantity of investments by phase, we see that there is a tendency for making fewer deals, 
which is relevant for the Venture segment as well.   
 
Figure 5.2. Amount invested by phase (million NOK) and number of investments by phase 
respectively. Source: NVCA, 2014. Private Equity Funds in Norway, activity report, p. 15 
Covering the recent industry changes, we can highlight two main characteristics of the 
Norwegian VC market. There is a growing trend for making fewer but bigger deals, that was 
also justified in 2014. The amount invested per VC deal continued to be high, but the total 
number of VC investments in 2014 was even lower than in 2013.  
With regard to the newest statistics on Norwegian VC activity from 2015, only 
preliminary conclusions can be made. Based on the data from Argentum for the first half of 
2015 the number of investments slowed down, driven by a fall in venture activity, while the 
total amount invested returned back to the level of 2009. The similar slowdown tendencies 
can be observed in the fundraising market. However, according to the Nordic Private Equity 
report (Argentum, 2015) the pipeline remains to be strong and fundraising still has the 
potential to beat the amount of 2014 by the end of the year.  
The illustration below demonstrates the fundraising dynamics in the Nordics VC 
market from 1991 to 2013.  
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*Data for 2013 is preliminary  
Figure 5.3. Nordic Fundraising. Source: EVCA, 2014. Nordic Private Equity in the context 
of Europe, p.4 
From this graph we can observe that in terms of total fundraising Sweden is a clear 
regional leader, followed by Norway which significantly lags behind. According to statistics 
of Argentum (2014), in terms of percentage contribution to the total European VC activity, the 
share of the Nordic countries remained fairly stable from 2010, amounting for around 10% of 
annual European fundraising.  
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Figure 5.4. Venture Capital Investments as percentage of GDP. Source: EVCA, 2014. 
European Private Equity activity report, p.49 
In order to benchmark Norway against the European counterparts, above there is 
statistics on Venture capital investment as a percentage of a country’s GDP. We can observe 
that in 2014 Norway has demonstrated a bit lower indicator that the average for 2010-2014, 
but in general ranking it occupies 6th place according to this parameter, and falls behind two 
Nordic countries among others: Sweden and Finland. There can be numerous reasons and 
interpretations for this fact, but in any case, considering the strength of Norwegian economy, 
we can clearly say that the VC market has strong prospects for development and has good 
opportunities for future growth, even though currently it seems to lag behind European 
industry leaders. This observation is addressing the general potential, and therefore is 
disregarding cyclical economic slowdowns and does not take into account the current 
downturn that the Norwegian market is going through due to the oil crisis. However, in the 
current context it is also necessary to point out that large amount of risk money in Norway has 
been traditionally directed towards the oil related services, and as the investment potential in 
this industry might shrink, it can potentially have a significant impact on the overall 
performance of this investment segment. In the same time, this trend can stimulate the flow of 
private money into other segments, which were underfinanced earlier.  
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In order to show the contrast, we address the Buyout segment, depicted on the graph 
below. We can observe that in 2014 Norway is leading the European ranking, it holds the 1st 
place on percentage of Buyout investments of country’s GDP, shows a significant increase in 
comparison to the average for the years 2010-2014. Other Nordic countries – Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden occupy respectively second, sixth and seventh places in this raking. In 
the same time if we address at the average indicator for 2010-2014, Sweden and the UK would 
turn out to be the leaders.  
 
Figure 5.5. Buyout Investments as percentage of GDP. Source: EVCA, 2014. European 
Private Equity activity report, p.50 
 
It was mentioned earlier, that the Buyout segment is much larger than the VC segment. 
The dynamics in the Buyout segment is also characterized by less, but bigger deals. At this 
stage an investor is mainly planning to buy a controlling stake in the company and often use a 
substantial amount of borrowed money too. In comparison to Venture, the Buyout segment is 
better represented in Norway. This type of PE investments is considered to be less risky, 
compared to the VC segment, and is often driven by purely financial or managerial control 
motives. In general, it can be concluded that at this point in time, Norwegian economic and 
business environment seem to have more stable and better developed market for later stage 
investments than for earlier stage investments. 
 
 38
6. Data and methodology  
6.1 Data collection  
The practical part of the current thesis is based on the data provided by Center for 
Service Innovation (CSI) at Norwegian School of Economics (NHH). This database on VC 
and PE investing covers a period from 1992 to 2013. In the subsequent analysis we will be 
utilizing only particular variables from the database, some of which have shorter time horizon 
of observations available. Therefore, we have no intention to make an exhaustive overview of 
the VC and PE activity for the whole period under research.  
Here are the main properties of the CSI database that will be covered: the sources of 
data and terminology being used.  
There are two main sources of data in the CSI database: 1) market data Argentum 
Private Equity and 2) accounting data SNF Center for applied research at NHH.  
1) Established in 2001, Argentum is an asset managing company specializing in 
investments in Northern-Europe and energy-focused private equity funds. It is wholly-owned 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and currently has NOK 17 billion under management 
(Argentum, 2015), whereof two thirds are managed on behalf of the Norwegian Government 
and one third on behalf of private investors. The company runs on commercial basis and 
contributes to efficient capital markets for unlisted companies. Argentum invests in the private 
equity market, conducting investments in other funds as well as direct investments. As part of 
argentum’s mission, they collect open information on VC and PE in the Nordics and publish 
it in a market database, covering various aspects of the deals on VC and PE scene. The 
information that was requested by CSI from Argentum Private Equity is a market database 
covering various aspects of the deals on VC and PE scene. 
2) SNF is one of Norway’s leading research environments within applied economic 
administrative research. It is a company within the NHH group with an objective to initiate, 
organize and conduct externally financed research. SNF support the development and 
maintenance of a database covering corporate accounting data for all Norwegian companies 
for the period from 1992 to present time.  
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From SNF database we have picked data from Norwegian Corporate Accounts for the 
investee firms, being supported by VC and PE, which were identified with the help of 
Argentum’s market data on funding and portfolio firms. Further, in the practical part when 
referring to different variables from the SNF accounting database, the special properties of 
each variable will be clarified.  
In order to cover the potential terminological concerns with regard to data, such as 
definitions of investment stages: Seed, Venture and Buyout, it is highlighted that in the dataset 
under research we use the classification developed by European Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) and  utilized by Argentum.  
6.2 Sample description  
The current database includes substantial amount of information on VC and PE deals 
and contains information about 683 portfolio firms coded in different variables. In the CSI 
database the data being used is expressed in 1000 NOK, while the ratios are stated as decimals. 
However not all values for the whole list of variables are available for this list of firms, 
therefore in our analysis for particular cases we will take smaller number of observations. 
There are many VC and PE funds and fund managers, that conducted the investments and 
accomplished the deals, but among others, they include such players as Viking Venture, 
Verdane Capital, Sarsia Seed, Norvestor, Northzone, HitecVision, Herkules Capital, EQT etc. 
The investment deals that are included in the database fall into the following broad 
sector classifications: Cleantech, Consumer goods, Energy, Health Care & Life Science, ICT 
and Industrial. Another major parameter that is critical for describing the data available is stage 
of investing that characterizes the fund’s focus area and has the following classification: Seed, 
Venture, Small/Mid-Cap Buyout, Large-Cap Buyout and Secondary investing.  The database 
does not contain any information about amounts invested in each firm, therefore analysing 
various segments and classifying the deals into sectors of investing we will be accessing the 
total number of investments made in each segment, not the total amount of capital invested.  
With regard to geographical scope, it is necessary to point out that current dataset 
includes the information about portfolio companies of PE and VC funds having an office in 
Norway, therefore it includes several Swedish funds, which are present in Norway and invest 
in Norwegian firms. In terms of location of portfolio companies, no foreign portfolio firms are 
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included in the database.  Conducting the subsequent analysis we will study the data in greater 
details and when necessary will provide clarifications and descriptions of additional data 
properties.  
6.3 Research question  
At the very beginning of this work, we set a priority to focus on the value-creating side 
of the investment activities. In the practical part we would like to address mainly the value 
creation on the firm level, generated by the injection of VC or PE money. More precise 
formulation of the research question is the following:  
How does VC and PE investing affects the growth and performance of the investee firms?  
In order to find an answer to the research question formulated above, we have chosen 
to study the following variables available in the CSI database: 1) sales revenues, 2) payroll 
expenses, 3) equity ratio, 4) patents, 5) R&D. We decided to focus our attention on these 
variables as we believe they can best demonstrate how the firm is evolving, and growing over 
time. The aim is to find out how the VC and PE investing impacts these variables, so that we 
can better understand overall effect of the investment activities on the economics of the 
investee firms. 
Looking into sales revenues we will track the dynamics of how firm’s operations were 
expanding, which will be our approximation for a financial indicator of firm’s external growth. 
When analysing payroll expenses we aim to approximate the social economic value 
that firm is generating, by employing more people and paying respective taxes.  
Equity ratio variable is a particularly good illustration for the difference between 
Seed/Venture and Buyout investing, as it indirectly indicates how expansion is financed on 
these stages.  
Addressing patents and R&D, we will concentrate more on internal development of 
the firm, of how it’s quality is growing, accumulating more expertise and value inside the firm.  
Overall looking into how these variables change with regard to VC and PE money 
injection we will understand the value creation impact on growth and performance of the 
investee firms.  
 41 
Below we provide abbreviations for the variables being studies, which are used in 
Norwegian Corporate Accounts and concise descriptions from the accounting data provided 
SNF Center for applied research at NHH. 
1) salgsinn 
Sales revenues show the value of goods and services sold during the period as a result 
of the company's ordinary main activities. Sales revenues are exclusive of tax and 
direct and indirect taxes, but include any grants or subsidies 
2) lonnsos 
Payroll expenses comprise all forms of remuneration to the company's employees and 
executive personnel, both current and former. This comprises pay, fees, holiday pay, 
bonuses, gifts to personnel, company car, subsidised canteen, free newspapers, benefits 
of options and share purchase schemes, subsidised holiday homes, subsidised loans 
etc., and remuneration of the company's board of directors, employer's National 
Insurance contributions and pension expenses 
3) ekandel 
Equity ratio shows equity as a share of total assets. Stated in decimals, not as a 
percentage. 
4) patent 
Patents includes permits, patents, licences, trademarks, contract rights and copyright. 
The value is in the right to use or exploit what is covered by the contract. 
5) fou 
Research and development concerns activities that aim to procure new knowledge, 
make research results commercially viable or to describe or design new products or 
production processes. Comprises the assessment, design, construction and testing of 
different types of prototypes (products, tools and production processes).  
 
6.4 Research methodology  
In order to study the chosen variables from the dataset, we conduct a descriptive 
statistical analysis using SPSS and STATA. As our aim is to discover and track major 
statistical patterns in value creation, and we were primarily focusing on utilizing Descriptive 
statistics in order to understand the key properties of the data. We also use Excel software for 
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computing the means and growth rates of variables and provide a comparison of these 
indicators.  
The main approach to analysing the chosen variables is computing mean values for 
these variables and comparing the results of the two groupings:  
1) before the investment is made and 2) after the investment is made. This way we will see 
how the injection of the private funding impacts the key characteristics of the firm. Also for 
the relevant variables we do a check for the short term affects of investing, looking at the 
means and growth rates for the short three year period after the investment is made. And, 
finally, aiming to understand the difference in the impact of VC investing on the performance 
of the firm compared to PE investing, which is conducted at later stage of the firm life cycle, 
and might have different implications for the firm, we will compare the samples of firms from 
the VC/Seed segment and Buyout segment.  
6.5 Credibility of research findings  
The credibility of data provided is supposed to be high. In this research, we are utilizing 
official accounting data for limited liability firms that have private investments. Public 
disclosure of accounting data is legally mandatory for such firms, also this data is subjected to 
auditing, therefore should be considered as credible and objective. The Argentum database 
that lies in the foundation of our dataset is based on open sources and covers most of the deals 
in the Nordic countries. This is the most trustful source available for market data in this 
segment of the financial market, but it can contain some missing data, due to investor’s 
unwillingness for public disclosure of details on investments. However, neither external data 
providers, nor NHH is responsible for the implications drawn from this data and thereafter all 
the conclusions made by the author are fully independent and remain the author’s intellectual 
property.  
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7. Analysis and findings 
7.1 Data sample overview  
In order to gain a better understanding of the data provided by CSI, we decided to start 
with looking into the categorization of investments for all 683 companies in the dataset. Before 
studying particular variables, which we chose for measuring growth and performance of the 
investee firms, we present several charts and graphs, which illustrate the overall properties of 
the data available.  
Below we provide a distribution of total number of all investments included into the 
dataset (N=683), per sector, which has abbreviation “bransje” in the CSI database. We can 
observe that two segments clearly stand out: ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) having 26,65% and Energy sector with 19,47%. Other sectors follow in the order 
of share size: Industrial (13,32%), Health Care and Life Science (11,86%), Consumer (9,66%), 
Cleantech (6,15%) and also other smaller sectors that cumulatively represent 12,88%.  
Not surprisingly, ICT sector has the highest percentage, as it is one of the most 
attractive investment segments globally and has great growth prospects, due to the diffusion 
of digital technologies and Internet services. Second largest sector that attracts many 
investments in Norway is Energy sector. Taking into account the resource extraction 
orientation of Norwegian economy, big flow of PE and VC investments into energy-related 
companies with primary focus on oil and gas extraction is also intuitively predictable.  
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Figure 7.1.1. Distribution of investments by sector, N=683 
We also addressed a more detailed sector subdivision of investments, using the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and the data from our dataset we observed that there 
are five specific industries which attract VC and PE money the most: 
 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
 Publishing activities; 
 Computer programming; consultancy and related activities; 
 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis; 
 Scientific research and development. 
The following chart is an illustration for the stage distribution of all investments 
included into the dataset (N=683), which is coded under “stadie” variable in the dataset. This 
division illustrates three major stages: Seed, Venture and Buyout. However, it is important to 
note, that each fund often invests several times in the same portfolio firm, but in our dataset 
only the first money injection is recorded. For example, if a VC fund brings money to the firm 
at the Seed stage, the investment will be counted as Seed investment, regardless the fact that 
the fund might continue investing on the Venture stage as well. On the contrary, NVCA 
statistics includes all funding at the actual stage when it takes place.  
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Figure 7.1.2. Distribution of investments by stage, N=683 
 
We can observe that Venture stage (48,61%) clearly dominates Seed (22,4%) and 
Buyout (28,99%) stages and represents just a slightly smaller share than Seed and Buyout 
combined. The main inference from this result is that overall investors have a clear preference 
for Venture segment.  In order to avoid confusion, it is worth pointing out that these amounts 
account for number of investments per stage, not total amounts of money invested.  
When studying the investment preferences with regard to sectors and stages, it is also 
important to look into arguments for investing that are driving investment activity. The 
histogram below demonstrates the primary investor motivation for investing. The valid data 
on this parameter is available for 368 companies from CSI database. The qualitative data on 
this characteristic was gathered by CSI using a questionnaire, where companies with presence 
of VC and PE money were asked to rank five most important arguments for investing. 
There is a big dispersion in numbers, but the key argument for investing in the majority 
of the cases is value creation through active involvement. Therefore, investors are aiming at 
bringing their competence and expertise to the investee firms, in order to develop them and 
enhance the growth. Second, third and fourth arguments are: value creation through active 
involvement and restructuring, value creating through pure restructuring and financial 
argument for investing. Therefore, it becomes clear that in majority of the cases of VC and PE 
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investors are eager to contribute through hands-on coaching and involvement into the 
company’s operations in order to add value to the investee firm.  
Figure 7.1.3. Primary argument for investing, N=368 
 
 
We would also like also cover the importance of different firm specific characteristics 
for value creation. Within the CSI research project a quantitative survey was initiated. The 
funds that conducted investments where asked to complete the questionnaire (example 
provided in Appendix), where they were proposed to assess the most important reasons for 
investing by ranking the top five most important arguments for each portfolio firm.  The two 
graphs below demonstrate the results of the survey. On the first graph, we see the distribution 
of responses for the request to mark the most important firm specific asset for value creation. 
The second graph shows responses on how investors perceive the second most important firm 
specific asset for value creation. The results of this survey are available for 292 firms. 
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Figure 7.1.4. The most important firm specific asset for value creation, N=292 
The previous graph depicts that investors value product uniqueness the highest. 
Therefore considering the investment opportunity this is the key driver that they assess. 
“Unique products” category is followed by “strong brand and market position” category, 
which still shows much lower value. We should also consider that these two characteristics 
are often interconnected so that product uniqueness leads to higher market position and brand 
recognition. This example demonstrates, that investors give more credit to the original driver. 
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Figure 7.1.5. The second most important firm specific asset for value creation, N=292   
According to this classification, we see that when investors were asked to rank the 
second most important firm specific asset for value creation they provided more diverse 
results. They think that the second biggest value creation potential lies in the new technologies, 
followed by intangible assets such as brand and unique product and service propositions. 
Therefore, we can anticipate that when investment decision is made, it is also significantly 
driven by the presence of firm specific assets depicted above.  
Making the overview of the dataset we can approximate a picture of typical firm that 
might to get the most attention from VC and PE investors: it is likely to be ICT company, at a 
Venture stage of development that has unique products and possesses technological know-
how. By bringing money to this company investors would be seeking to create value though 
active involvement, hands-on coaching and mentorship of the core team. 
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7.2 Variable analysis  
7.2.1 Sales revenues 
We start looking into particular accounting variables with analysing the variable 
“salgsinn” from the classification used in CSI database, which stands for sales revenues. For 
this variable we have the data available from 1992 to 2013. Aiming to avoid confusion, we 
will restate that the data we are using from the CSI database is expressed in 1000 NOK.  
Analysing the sales revenues variable will help us to understand the dynamics of 
company’s external growth and expansion of operations. Sales revenues account for economic 
value creation with regard to company’s growth: the more it produces and sells, the more taxes 
are being paid and the higher is the company’s contribution to country’s GDP.  We attempt to 
get a better picture of how the VC and PE investing impacts company’s sales revenues. The 
data allow us to do a comparison over the whole sample of companies including both the VC 
and PE supported firms.   
In order to clear up the dataset before analysis for getting more accurate results, we 
have gone through the following procedures: excluded companies with partially missing or 
incorrect data and checked for outliers. We decided to include only firms, which have 
consistent data available for at least one year before and one year after the investment is made. 
However, making this choice we are losing some of the Seed investments from our sample, 
which cover the companies that receive money in the same year as they were formed. For the 
purposes of this analysis, we find the current adjustment acceptable.  
Having this data for the investee companies, we can check for immediate effect of 
investing. In total, at this stage, we obtained 296 observations. After, eliminating outliers that 
have sales revenues over 1000000, we ended up with the 290 observations. Below we present 
descriptive statistics for sales revenues under these three scenarios: one year before 
investment, one year after investment and three years after investment.  
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Table 7.2.1.1.Key descriptive statistics on sales revenues  
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
1 year 
before 
investing 
 
 
68356.98 
 
 
10417 
 
 
136969.3 
 
 
23 
 
 
925366 
1 year 
after 
investing 
 
 
99652.49 
 
 
17487 
 
 
192449.4 
 
 
11 
 
 
1514832 
3 years 
after 
investing 
 
 
111725.4 
 
 
20911.67 
 
 
216936.6 
 
 
31 
 
 
1634717 
 
From the comparative table presented above we can see that the mean value was 
continuously growing from the pre-investment period all over to 3 years post-investment, 
showing a larger relative change one year post investment. The same intuitive tendency is 
justified for Median, Standard Deviation and Maximum value. 
Below we provided graphical illustrations for the initial distribution of sales revenues 
in the adjusted data sample one year before investing for companies and Seed/Venture and 
Buyout stages separately in order to observe the difference.  
We can see that the distribution for Seed/Venture stage is very right skewed, so that 
nearly all observations lie within the revenue benchmark before 100000. Moreover, also see 
that pre-investment sales revenue is very concentrated as 80% of all observation lie in the 
lowest category. 
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Figure 7.2.1.1. Distribution of sales revenues 1 year pre-investment for companies on 
Seed/Venture stage 
The graph below shows the distribution for sales revenues for Buyout segment. We 
observe that even if over 30% of observations are concentrated in the lowest category, the 
other cases are more smoothly distributed compared to the Seed/Venture distribution.  
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Figure 7.2.1.2. Distribution of sales revenues 1 year pre-investment for companies on Buyout 
stage 
The graphical comparison of these two histograms makes shows that the average one-
year pre-investment sales revenue is lower for Seed/Venture companies that for Buyout, which 
is intuitive as these companies are smaller, less experienced and are at an earlier development 
stage. 
As a next step, in order to compare means we utilize Independent samples T-test. It is 
a common statistical technique applied in the case when there is a need to study whether two 
sets of data are significantly different from one another. P-value is the key characteristic 
indicating the significance and therefore validity of the outcome received. In this case we 
chose a 5% significance level. 
We are computing the means for sales revenues for two distinct scenarios using the 
overall sample:  1) one year before and one year after the investment is made in order to 
understand the short term impact of investing; 2) one year before and three years after to 
understand the longer term impact.  
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Table 7.2.1.2. Statistics on mean sales revenues for 1 year before investing and 1 year after 
investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
1 year before 
investing 68356.98 9808.28 6.969313 8.71E-12 
Δ 1 year after 
investing 31295.51 13871 2.256182 0.024432 
 
With high level of significance, we observe a large increase in the mean value for sales 
revenues one year after investing, compared to one year before investing. In absolute terms, 
the initial pre-investment mean value was 68356.98, it increased 31295.51 and resulted in 
99652.49 one-year post-investment, therefore we also clearly observe a positive impact on 
expansion of sales revenues. In the same time, we can argue that as firms grow and scale up, 
the revenue is growing naturally, and as we do not decompose the effects causing this change, 
we take into account that it might not be caused by purely investment impact, but by natural 
expansion of the firm. The best way to test this assumption, would be to create a control group 
of firms that did not receive any VC or PE investing. However, due to time constraints and 
lack of data available we were not able to check for this effect.  
In the same time, as we track the short term impact, it seems clear that developing 
naturally a firm would not receive such a rise in revenue, so the injection of private money has 
a partial impact on the observed growth in revenue.   
Below we look into the longer time horizon and provide statistics on the mean values 
one year before investing and three years after. We can observe from the P-Value that the 
output is significant.  
 
 
 
 
 54
Table 7.2.1.3. Statistics on mean sales revenues for 1 year before investing and 3 years after 
investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-Value 
1 year before 
investing 68356.98 10653 6.416691 2.9E-10 
Δ 3 years after 
investing 43368.4 15065.61 2.878636 0.004142 
 
We can see that three years post-investment there change in the mean value is higher, 
but this difference is not striking so, we believe that this effect can be credited towards the 
natural growth of the firm, and not that much to the investment impact. Therefore comparing 
the two situations it might be that first year post investment absorbs much of the effect of 
money injection with regard to growth in sales revenue. Another potential explanation could 
be the slow development of the new venture and a clear focus on restructuring at Buyout stage, 
which has a longer term impact on the firm, but might not have high impact on the 3 year 
horizon. Later in this section we address the differences observed between Seed/Venture and 
Buyout, therefore will try to have a more segmented and detailed look at this issue.  
Willing to compare Seed/Venture stage to Buyout in terms of impact on sales revenues, 
we conduct a similar analysis. We study mean values for sales revenues under the following 
conditions 1) one year before the investment for Seed/Venture vs. one year before the 
investment for Buyout; 2) one  year after for Seed/Venture vs. one year after for Buyout; 3) 
three years after for Venture/Seed vs. three years after for Buyout. In the final adjusted sample 
we have 192 companies on Seed/Venture stage and 98 companies on Buyout stage.  
In order to separate the effects of money injection of investments made on different 
stages of company life cycle we compare the mean values for sales revenues for two groupings 
Seed/Venture versus Buyout investments.  
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Table 7.2.1.4. Statistics on mean sales revenues 1 year before investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 1 
year before 
investing 16131.69 8368.152 
1.92774
8 0.05487 
Δ Buyout - 1 year 
before investing 154544.2 14395.13 
10.7358
7 7.74E-23 
 
Table 7.2.1.5. Statistics on mean sales revenues 1 year after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 1 
year after 
investing 36225.51 12338.31 2.936019 0.003593 
Δ Buyout - 1 year 
after investing 187692.1 21224.7 8.843099 9.52E-17 
 
Table 7.2.1.6. Statistics on mean sales revenues 3 years after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
  
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 3 
years after 
investing 44654.89 14133 3.15962 0.001748 
Δ Buyout - 3 
years after 
investing 198473.9 24311.97 8.163627 1.03E-14 
 
In this section we have observed several important implications on mean values sales 
revenues of the companies in our sample. With regard to change in scale, we can have a look 
at the table comparing pre-investment conditions of Seed/Venture and Buyout companies and 
observe that investments of Buyout segment are initially made into companies of 
approximately 10 times bigger than the investee firms in Seed/Venture segment. The first 
inference is that as far as the growth and expansion of revenues is a relative indicator, we see 
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that the companies in the Seed/Venture are showing more than 100% growth one year after 
investing, while companies on the Buyout stage demonstrate more moderate results, as they 
are already more mature at the time of investment. In this respect, we also have to take into 
account the fact that smaller firms have higher relative growth, while bigger ones have smaller 
relative growth even if the absolute values are much larger. 
  The second implication, is that besides the fact that a significant difference still remains 
present three years after investing we can see that the mean values for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout are converging, due to higher relative increases for Seed/Venture firms compared to 
Buyout. Our concluding observation after studying these examples is that the relative increase 
in sales revenues is not only correlated with the VC and PE investment itself, but also with the 
stage of the company’s maturity.  
7.2.2 Payroll expenses  
In this part we will study the payroll expenses variable, which is marked as “lonnsos” 
in the CSI database and try to figure out how the VC and PE investing impacts this variable. 
The data on payroll expenses is available for the same time period as for sales revenues: from 
1992 to 2013. The approach we are using for this analysis is similar to the one utilized in the 
previous section.  
This variable account for the total amount of payroll, therefore the growth of this 
parameter comprises both the expansion in the number of staff and the increase in salary paid 
per employee. Compared to sales revenues, which is one of the main parameters for measuring 
company’s size and growth, payroll expenses reflect the internal development of the company. 
In terms of value generated for the economy this parameter is not less important than sales 
revenues. Besides purely economic impact, it also indirectly reflects the effect on social value 
that company generates with regard to number of people employed, expressed in amounts of 
salary being paid. When company is expanding operations in order to increase sales revenues, 
often it will require more employees in order to respond the growing needs. Therefore, we 
expect that payroll expenses on average have positive correlation with sales revenues. 
However, that it is not always the case for particular industries such as ICT. Creation of IT 
solutions and many tech-products is labour intensive at the development stage, but when there 
is a finished product, often it does not require much additional personnel to scale the business 
further. In such a case, our payroll might not be growing proportionally to revenues.  
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Having the objective to receive as representative results as possible, we decided to 
clear up the data. Initially we had the accurate data available for 326 companies, but after 
excluding outliers which have payroll values higher that 200 000 (expressed in 1000 NOK) 
we ended up with a sample of 319 observations.  
In the table below, we provide descriptive statistics on mean payroll expenses for three 
distinct cases: one year before investing, one year after investing, three years after investing. 
We can see that Mean, Median, Standard Deviation and Maximum values are growing, 
confirming our initial assumption about growth of payroll expenses with the maturity of the 
firm and injection of investment money. 
Table 7.2.2.1. Descriptive statistics on payroll expenses   
  
Mean  
 
Median  
Standard 
Deviation  
 
Minimum  
 
Maximum  
1 year before 
investing 
18137.75 4119 31710.39 
 
 
2 
 
 
198186 
1 year after 
investing 
 
25217 
 
8079 
 
39720.93 
 
29 
 
241964 
3 years after 
investing 
 
 
28358.18 
 
 
9187.333 
 
 
44553.27 
 
 
29 
 
 
300988.3 
 
As a graphical illustration, below we provide a histogram on pre-investment payroll 
expenses one year before investing for Seed/Venture and Buyout stages. 
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Figure. 7.2.2.1. Distribution of payroll expenses 1vyear pre-investment for companies on 
Seed/Venture stages 
Looking at the graphs above below, we see that both distributions are right skewed, 
but the distribution for Buyout investments is less concentrated. The histogram covering 
Seed/Venture stages has a more smooth shape, compared to Buyout presented depicted on the 
following chart, and on average we can see that payroll expenses are higher at Buyout stage. 
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Figure. 7.2.2.2. Distribution of payroll expenses 1 year pre-investment for companies Buyout 
stage 
Comparing the means for the payroll variable, we make calculations under two 
scenarios for the overall sample:  1) one year before and one year after the investment is made 
in order to understand the short term impact of investing; 2) one year before and three years 
after to understand for the longer term impact. The statistical output is provided below.  
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Table 7.2.2.2. Statistics on mean payroll expenses for 1 year before investing and 1 year after 
investing 
  
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
1 year before 
investing  18137.75 2773.256 6.540236 1.25E-10 
Δ 1 year after 
investing  13652.36 3900.866 3.499829 0.000498 
 
We observe a large increase in the mean value for payroll expenses one year after 
investing compared to one year before investing, which is statistically significant. This fact 
can be interpreted as an indication of expansion in the number of staff, meaning that growing 
company hired more people and created additional social and economic value. After getting 
sufficient funding many companies decide to hire professional management team, aspiring 
that it can significantly help increasing the growth in the firm. Such a decision may also case 
a rise in payroll expenses as professional managers often demand very high salaries.  
Table 7.2.2.3. Statistics on mean payroll variables for 1 year before investing and 3 years after  
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
1 year before 
investing 18137.75 3112.791 5.826844 8.93E-09 
Δ 3 years after 
investing 17428.4 4378.457 3.98049 7.66E-05 
 
Looking at the table above, we can observe statistics for the mean payroll expenses for 
one year before and three years after investing. Comparing these values, we see that the 
increase is almost as large as the initial value, meaning that the value doubles over the four-
year period counting from the year before investing. However comparing the changes, we can 
see that the difference between one year after and three years after investment is made is not 
that large, therefore  we can conclude that the biggest impact of investing on payroll expenses 
is concentrated on shorter time horizon. 
Making the distinction between the stages and checking for the investment impact on 
Seed/Venture vs. Buyout stage we are applying the same procedure. In our dataset we have 
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218 companies on Seed/Venture stage and 101 on Buyout stage. The statistics output for three 
distinct cases is presented in the tables below. 
Table 7.2.2.4. Statistics on mean payroll expenses 1 year before investing for Seed/Venture 
and Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture -1 
year before 
investing 6598.28 1816.709 3.631995 0.000328 
Buyout - Δ 1 year 
before investing 36446.44 3228.644 11.28847 4.57E-25 
 
Looking at the pre-investment condition we see that the mean payroll value for 
Seed/Venture stage is about seven times smaller than for Buyout, which can be an indication 
of both that earlier stage companies obviously employ less people and that on average they 
pay lower wages to employees.  
Table 7.2.2.5. Statistics on mean payroll expenses 1 year after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 1 
year after 
investing 10585.38 3690.32 2.868417 0.004396 
Buyout - Δ 1 
year after 64006.88 6411.52 9.983106 1.22E-20 
 
Table 7.2.2.6. Statistics on mean payroll expenses 3 years after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture -3 
years after 
investing 12517.13 4319.935 2.897527 0.004017 
Buyout Δ-  3 
year after 
investing 69573.9 7505.406 9.269839 2.69E-18 
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The two tables above exhibit the mean values for post-investment payroll expenses and 
show the comparison between Seed/Venture and Buyout for two time horizons: one year after 
investing and three years after investing. The main implications are the following: we observe 
that at the Buyout stage payroll expenses are higher than for Seed/Venture because the 
companies are generally bigger, more mature and consequently require more staff.  We also 
see that the largest increase in the mean values for both Seed/Venture and Buyout happens 
within the first year after investing, while the value for three years post-investment years do 
not change much.   
In this respect, we can conclude that the injection of VC and PE money definitely has 
a positive impact on this parameter, indicating that economic value is created via increasing 
company’s payroll expenses, meaning that more staff is employed.  
7.2.3 Equity ratio 
For many companies getting funding through equity is an important type of raising 
capital for expansion. However, firms at the Buyout stage firms also have access to debt 
financing which is possible because of both investment of new additional equity and higher 
security and guarantees provided by PE management firm.  
In this section we will study the variable called Equity Ratio, which shows equity as a share 
of total assets coded under “ekandel” in the CSI database. Observations on this variable are 
available for all years from 1992 to 2013.  
In order to increase the accuracy of the results, we made some adjustments to the data 
available.  We excluded the companies with missing values, eliminated negative values and 
made other minor adjustments in order to achieve higher accuracy of the analysis. 
However, there was a challenge that not all companies had time series that are long 
enough to track the values up to three years post-investment. In order to solve this problem we 
created two separate samples for descriptive statistics for one-year post-investment and three-
years post-investment, where the number of observations varied. The first sample contained 
total of 250 observations (out of which there are 152 marked as Seed/Venture and 98 Buyouts) 
and, while the other sample had only 191 observations (118 at Seed/Venture stage and 73 
Buyouts). Below we provide the descriptive statistics for these two distinct cases. 
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Table 7.2.3.1 Descriptive statistics on Equity Ratio (1) 
 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Count  
1 year before 
investing 
0.42352 0.38 0.257539 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
250 
1 year after 
investing 
 
 
0.48088 
 
 
0.435 
 
 
0.270164 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
250 
 
Table 7.2.3.2 Descriptive statistics on Equity Ratio (2) 
 
  
Mean  
 
Median  
Standard 
Deviation  
 
Minimum  
 
Maximum  
 
Count  
1 year before 
investing  0.418
482 0.38 0.263881 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
191 
3 years after 
investing  
 
 
0.491
108 
 
 
0.463333 
 
 
0.259612 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
0.983333 
 
 
191 
 
 
Analysing the overall sample for one year pre- and one year post-investment we 
observe that the mean value for Equity ratio has nearly 6% increase post-investment, meaning 
that the share of equity in the total assets is growing. P-Value justifies that this result is 
statistically significant. 
Table 7.2.3.3. Statistics on mean equity ratio for 1 year before investing and 1 year after 
investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
1-year before 
investing 0.42352 0.016692 25.37228 8.94E-92 
1-year after 
investing 0.05736 0.023606 2.429852 0.015457 
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We observe the same consistent trend also on the three-year post-investment horizon, 
which is also statistically significant.  
Table 7.2.3.4. Statistics on mean equity ratio for 1 year before investing and 3 years after 
investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
1-year before 
investing 0.418482 0.01894 22.09521 3.61E-70 
Δ 3-years after 
investing 0.072627 0.026785 2.711452 0.007003 
 
Addressing the differences in Seed/Venture and Buyout, we will look into the three 
cases: comparing the mean values one year before investing, one year after investing and three 
years after investing.  
Table 7.2.3.5. Statistics on mean equity ratio 1 year before investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 1 
year before investing 0.473684 0.020304 23.33015 1.72E-64 
Δ Buyout - 1 year 
before investing -0.12797 0.032429 -3.9462 0.000103 
 
We see that even before investing the mean coefficient for Buyout stage is lower, than 
for Seed/Venture, meaning that proportion of equity capital in total assets is smaller. It might 
also be a signal that at the Buyout stage the debt is already present in the company.  
Table 7.2.3.6. Statistics on mean equity ratio for 1 year after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Seed/Venture - 1 
year after investing 0.488951 0.021251 23.00801 1.82E-63 
Δ Buyout - 1 year 
after investing -0.02293 0.035819 -0.6401 0.522697 
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In the table above we can see how the situation changed one year-post investment. 
However, as P-Value indicates the statistical insignificance of this test, we can not make any 
valid inferences from the generated output.  
On the three years post-investment horizon we have obtained very interesting results, 
which are statistically significant.  
Table 7.2.3.7. Statistics on mean equity ratio for 3 years after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Venture/Seed - 3 
years after 
investing 0.549222 0.022728 24.16517 1.04E-59 
Δ Buyout - 3 
years after 
investing -0.15633 0.037277 -4.19382 4.21E-05 
 
Comparing the mean values for Equity Ratio for the Seed/Venture and Buyout three 
years post-investment, we came to the conclusion, that the share of equity capital in 
Seed/Venture stage is growing, while the Buyout segment demonstrates the relative drop. PE 
investing on Buyout stage is often characterised by utilizing the combination of equity and 
debt financing, and our observation justifies this fact. Often such process is happening in the 
following order: investors first increase credibility of the company by bringing into private 
money, and afterwards the company starts getting debt financing, that reduces the mean value 
for equity ratio.  
7.2.4 Patents  
It is often a matter of heated debate whether innovative companies have easier access 
to funding, or whether the opposite relation exists. If the latter is the case, as the company’s 
level of innovation activity increases it gets addition financing and attract the interest from 
investors. This topic deserves a separate study, however within this work we attempt to 
enhance the understanding of what is the impact of VC and PE investing on indirect measures 
of innovative activity within a firm.  
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Here we will analyse whether there is a link between the VC and PE investment activity 
and mean value of patents per investee firm, which we approximated to be a measure of 
innovative activity. This variable coded as “patent” in the CSI database. This variable is used 
as a measure for intellectual property in wide, besides patents in also includes value for 
licences, trademarks etc. The data on this variable is available for 12 years from 1999 to 2011.  
As the investment money in the company can be allocated differently, and therefore it 
can have different impact on the operations. In our case, it interesting to track the impact on 
intellectual property. We will study this parameter in two dimensions: first check for the mean 
value before and after the investing in order to discover the impact of investing and afterwards 
see how the patenting activity is different on the post-investment stage for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout stages. For the purposes of the current analysis we excluded inaccurate data, 
eliminated incorrect and missing values, in order to assure that we obtain valid results. Below 
we provide descriptive statistics on the patent variable before and after investing.  
Table.7.2.4.1 Descriptive statistics on patents 
  
Mean 
 
Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Count 
Before 
investing 
9437.037 979.5 47808.12 
 
 
10 
 
 
434107 
 
 
106 
After 
investing 
 
10945.99 
 
1319.875 
 
68715.55 
 
10 
 
880750.2 
 
174 
 
We proceed with analysing the pre- and post-investment cases looking into the mean 
value to patents.  
Table 7.2.4.2. Statistics on mean number of patents before and after investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-value 
Before investing 
 
9437,037 5988,728 1,5758 0,116209 
Δ After investing 
 
1508,949 7596,945 0,198626 0,842701 
 
Observing coefficients, we see that there is an increase in the mean number of patents 
after investment is made, compared to the pre-investment period, however, P-value signals 
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that this conclusion is statistically insignificant, which can be the case due to high dispersion 
of results on this parameter in the dataset being analysed. Therefore, we conclude that there is 
no statistically different changes in the number of patents per company.  
Looking into the post-investment values for Venture/Seed and Buyout segments we 
observe that post-investment mean number of patents in Buyout is supposed to be lower than 
on Seed/Venture stage. However, the P-Value also indicates that this observation is 
statistically insignificant, therefore we can say that there is no valid difference between the 
patenting activity on Seed/Venture stage.  
Table 7.2.4.3. Statistics on mean number of patents after investing for Seed/Venture and 
Buyout segments 
 Coefficients 
 
Standard Error t-Stat P-Value 
Seed/Venture 
 
11997,58 6237,548 1,923444 0,056076 
     
Δ Buyout -3518,78 11410,03 -0,30839 0,758156 
 
We can conclude that there are neither valid differences in patenting activity between 
pre-investment and post-investment cases, nor with regard to Seed/Venture and Buyout stage 
segmentation. However, we discovered that with regard to the number of companies involved 
in the patenting activity, we observed a growing trend. While before investments only 106 
companies had patents, this value increased to 174 companies on the post-investment horizon, 
which is a positive sign that over time with attracting investment resources number of 
companies involved in patenting activity is growing. 
7.2.5 Research and Development  
Looking at Research and Development variable (R&D), we will try to track how VC 
and PE investing impacts the innovating process. High R&D means that the company is eager 
to evolve and improve the existing model by putting effort in research activities.  
For accomplishing our goal, we will study the variable “fou” from CSI database. We 
will compare means before investing, after investing and run the same procedure for 
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Seed/Venture and Buyout stage in order to understand the difference that might exist between 
these two stages. The data on this variable is available for 12 years from 1999 to 2011. 
As we did for other cases, we excluded the missing and incorrect values, making 
adjustments to the initial dataset. In this case, we decided to take a slightly different approach 
to analysis and looked into the variable over the whole period before investing and after 
investing. Below we provided descriptive statistics on this variable. 
Table 7.2.5.1 Descriptive statistics on R&D 
  
Mean  
 
Median  
Standard 
Deviation  
 
Minimum  
 
Maximum  
 
Count  
 
 
Before investing 3529.37 1473 5797.859 
 
 
79 
 
 
42710 
 
 
97 
 
After investing 
 
8449.984 
 
3303.833 
 
16281.38 
 
25 
 
154250.3 
 
138 
 
In general proactive R&D activity is likely to happen when company is in a good 
financial state. It is linked to improving and modernizing the current business and is often 
capital intensive, therefore requires spare resources. Firms are not eager to spend money on 
R&D when they are facing operational challenges. On the other hand, these activities often 
create a good start for further quick expansion of the firm, making a technological 
improvement or qualitatively changing the core service or product.  
In the next table we provide statistical output generated for the R&D variable in the 
two cases: before and after investing.  
Table 7.2.5.2. Statistics on mean values for R&D before and after investing 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-Value 
 
Before investing 3529,37 1322,737 2,668232 0,008161 
 
Δ After investing 4920,62 1726,108 2,850698 0,004754 
 
This example is extremely valuable for our analysis, as the P-value indicates that 
results are statistically significant. We see that after investing the mean value for R&D is much 
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higher than before investing. There can be many potential reasons why it is the case, such as 
the fact that intensive R&D activities become key focus for the company only at a particular 
stage of the development as earlier it might not have the capacity for that. However, the fact 
that investment activities have a positive impact on R&D is a valid conclusion from our 
analysis.   
Referring to the table below, we look into the post-investment situation in 
Seed/Venture and Buyout segment and observe that the mean R&D value for Buyout is smaller 
than for Venture segment, which can be the implication of the fact that companies are willing 
to emphasise this activity on the earlier stage. However, the indication for the P-value shows 
that this result is not statistically significant, therefore, this finding is not valid. 
Table 7.2.5.3. Statistics on mean value for R&D after investing for Seed/Venture and Buyout 
segments 
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t-Stat P-Value 
 
Seed/Venture 8790,797 1601,298 5,489796 1,91E-07 
 
Δ Buyout -1383,3 3226,058 -0,42879 0,668755 
 
Making the conclusion about the mean R&D value, we see that it has significantly 
increased in the post-investment period, meaning that PE and VC investing has a positive 
impact on this parameter. Looking into how many companies had R&D activities pre and post 
investment we observe a significant increase in the total amount of firms involved in the R&D 
from 97 firms before investing to 138 after investing. Therefore, we can say that investment 
activity not only enhanced R&D in the firms that were already active in this field, but also 
attracted new ones.  
7.3 Conclusion 
In the empirical part we have analysed investment impact on the value creation in the 
investee firms considering five variables: sales revenues, payroll expenses, equity ratio, 
patents and R&D.  
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Our results tell that there is a statistically significant post-investment increase in sales 
revenues of the investee firm, therefore the trend of growing sales is justified. The impact on 
companies at Seed/Venture stage is bigger than on Buyout companies, as they are more mature 
and either use investment money differently, or just have more modest growth prospects. 
With regard to payroll expenses we observed that the value creation is mostly 
concentrated on the short time post investment horizon as the value expands more one year 
post investment. Overall, it is clear, that the injection of VC and PE money has a positive 
impact on this parameter, indicating that economic value is created via increasing company’s 
payroll expenses, meaning that more staff is employed.  
Analysing the equity ratio we justified the theoretical implication, that it is supposed 
to be lower post investment on buyout stage, meaning that company besides equity financing 
is using debt financing, that can enhance even more value creation, whereas share of equity 
capital in Seed/Venture stage is growing.  
With regard to patenting activity we did not find any statistically significant inferences 
on the correlation of patenting activity existing before VC and PE investing and the fact of 
money injection, but we realized found that the number of companies involved in the patenting 
activity, significantly increased post investment.  
The mean R&D value significantly increased in the post-investment period, meaning 
that PE and VC investing has a positive impact on this parameter, the same trend was observed 
with number of companies – the amount of firms involved in R&D significantly increased on 
the post investment horizon.  
Therefore, we confirmed that VC and PE investing has a positive impact on value 
creation in the investee firms. We found out that company’s post investment performance 
regardless the stage of investing is generally better than pre investment. This finding justifies 
the fact that VC and PE investing is an effective mechanism for expanding the business. As 
discussed earlier, if we take into account that in comparison to many other European countries 
Norwegian VC and PE scene is rather underdeveloped, it seems clear that there is a big 
economic value to be captured on both company and country level if the potential of VC and 
PE activity will be utilized more efficiently.  
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7.4 Limitations and directions for future research  
There are several limitations, that have to be mentioned with regard to the current 
research. Initially we made a choice to use exclusively the dataset provided by CSI, and 
therefore were restricted by the amount of data being analysed. Even though the initial amount 
of companies present in the dataset is 683, there was a smaller group of companies that had 
accurate data for all the variables analysed as well as for the time period required. In this case, 
we also encountered a problem of survival bias. Only the companies that were active and had 
the data for the whole period required were analysed. Due to this for each variable we used 
slightly different data samples, trying to increase the precision of our findings. In particular, 
limited amount of data was available for such variables as patents and R&D. Because of these 
limitations, we had to use a generally smaller data sample, with fewer observations, that might 
have an impact on generalizability of our findings.  
Another constraint is connected to the choice of methodology and particular variables 
for measuring the company’s performance and value creation. One might argue, that there are 
more precise and sophisticated techniques that can be used to analysis, but we decided to 
concentrate on the universal method of comparing means that was consistently used 
throughout the whole analysis and helped us to achieve the stated goals.  
Conducting further research in this field it would be interesting to go beyond the 
differences between VC/PE supported firms on various development stages and address 
differences in performance and value creation between non VC/PE supported companies and 
the ones that do not have VC backing. As mentioned earlier, performing such analysis would 
require new data and for this purpose we would need to construct a separate control group of 
companies. The study of sectoral differences also deserves a separate research. The 
understanding of how value creation and growth potential of companies supported by VC and 
PE backing might vary with regard to the industry and sector will lead to having a more 
accurate picture of which industries gain the most from this type of financing and which need 
another financing model to enhance the efficiency. 
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Appendix 
 
Sample questionnaire for Fund X 
 
1) Please consider the significance of the following investment criteria each portfolio 
company and choose the most relevant in the table below.  
 
Company name  
Main argument for investing  
Financial 
Value 
creation 
through 
active 
involvement 
Value creation 
`through 
restructuring Other 
Company 1     
Company 2     
Company 3     
Company 4     
Company 5     
Company …      
 
2) In the table below we ask Fund X to specify why the particular investment was made. 
In the left column, we provide a list of arguments.  For which company we ask Fund 
X to choose and rate the main reasons for investing / values, which are crucial for the 
development of the enterprise. For rating we use the following classification: 1 = 
Most important, 2 = Second most importance , 3 = Third most important, 4 = Fourth 
importantly , 5 = fifth most important. If you have other reason for investing that the 
ones provided, please select “Other” and specify.  
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Most important assets for future value creation  
1. Unique products  
2. Unique processes  
3. Strong brand an market position  
4. Economics of scale  
5. Technological know-how  
6. Managerial expertise  
7. Resistance to economic shocks  
8. Potential for growth  
9. Client focus  
10. Strategic vision  
11. Innovation potential  
12. Global expertise  
13. Social responsibility  
14. Business network  
15. Patents and licenses  
16. Access to natural resources  
17. Good location  
18. Other  
 
 
 
